the sum of its parts, they mean that properties of the whole are not determined by the unary, nonrelational, properties of the parts. To me, the point that holists are making is a truism. That relational properties must be taken into account seems obvious. It looks like this point is true, not just of social objects, but of any object which has parts. One might even suspect that the principle is a priori, or as a priori as anything can be.
Do individualists seriously propose to ignore relations? Are individualists really such benighted atomists? Not at all, say the individualists, who insist they not be confused with the straw man just discussed. Individualists concede that social facts cannot be understood by taking individuals in isolation from each other. But the crucial point is that the character of the whole is fixed by the properties and relations of its parts. The whole is nothing above and beyond those interactions among individuals. Individualists will deny being atomists. What accusation might they hurl back at the holists? Holists, they say, hypostatize (reify) social wholes. Holists, according to this indictment, think that properties of social wholes are not determined by the interactions that individuals have with each other and with the environment. Where, then, does this independent existence of social wholes come from? What is the secret added ingredient one must add to individuals, the environment, and their interactions to get social facts? Holism, thus construed, looks like old-fashioned vitalism; it isn't that some mysterious fluid must be added to matter to get life. Rather, holism is portrayed as holding that you must add some sort of occult social fluid to individuals and their interactions to get social groups.
This time it is the individualists who seem to be right. Reification is precisely what holists are up to, if they believe that the whole is not determined by its parts and their interactions with each other and the environment. Individualism does seem to be correct in claiming that properties of wholes are determined by properties of parts, in this sense.
So what has happened to this dismal dispute? One could embrace atomism on the one hand or hypostatis on the other, and doubtless there have been social scientists who have done so, in practice if not in theory. But if one rejects both of these alternatives, there seems to be no issue left. Yes, in one sense, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, but, in another sense, no, it is not. What else is The truisms, then, do not concern how we might best attempt to understand a particular social fact, but concern that fact's causal connec- In what follows, it will be argued that the dispute about the units of selection resembles the holism/individualism dispute, but with the concept of natural selection replacing the more general idea of causality. This replacement makes all the difference in the world, however.
Holists and individualists are, or should be, driven to disgruntled agreement by considerations that are not specifically sociological and appear to be almost a priori (like the fact that causality is transitive). In contrast, group selection and individual selection hypotheses admit of no such easy resolution; this dispute, properly construed, turns out to be an interesting empirical and specifical'ly biological one. What is more, the lack of asymmetries just noted, when 2. Historical and Conceptual Background I just argued that holists and individualists interpret the clich'e "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" in two different ways. The interpretations given a priori bias the case: holists interpret the slogan in such a way that it cannot fail to be true, whereas individualists tend to understand it in such a way that it cannot fail to be false. This same situation obtains, in much less virulent form, in the unit of selection controversy. I will address here the dispute between group and organismic selectionists, leaving to one side the issues raised concerning genic and molecular selection at one end of the spectrum, and interspecies and community selection at the other (although a brief comment will be made about this in section 6). Authors who believe that group selection has played a relatively minor role in evolution tend to use a definition of group selection that is extremely restrictive; authors who attribute greater potential importance to this selective force often use a more liberal, permissive, conception of group selection. What is more, each position has fairly cogent criticisms of some of the ideas on the other side.
The philosophical focus of this paper is on determining what group selection is; the hope is that we can then use this clarification to pinpoint what distinguishes group and individual processes generally.
Yet, it is well to remember that biologists do not have this as their motivation for thinking about group selection, nor did they become interested in group selection as an idle conceptual exercise. The historical context for the recent incarnation of the group selection controversy is that group selection was hypothesized as an explanation of phenomena that allegedly could not be explained in any other way. In 1962, V. C. Wynne-Edwards published his book Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior. There, he argued that certain adaptations found in nature would be counterpredicted if individual selection were the only selective force at work. Wynne-Edwards talked about the ways in which prey populations react to the approach of predators. He discussed territoriality. He devoted a great deal of attention to the idea that organisms limit their own reproduction when the population approaches the environment's carrying capacity. Each of these categories involves traits which he thought were altruistic: organisms possessing such traits diminished their own reproductive chances while enhancing the fitness of the group. Altruism is always at a disadvantage when compared with selfishness, as far as individual selection is concerned. But groups of altruists may do better than groups of selfish individuals, and this, Wynne-Edwards argued, explains why altruism is such a common and stable phenomenon in nature. do not, since it is more parsimonious, he says, to invoke individual selection alone to account for these controversial cases.
Since I have discussed the principle of parsimony and its application to the group selection controversy elsewhere (1981b), I will not go into a great deal of detail in discussing the merits of such arguments in general or of Williams' argument in particular. However, a few comments are in order. One, not uncommon, reaction to Williams' parsimony argument is to dismiss it in such a way as to imply that considerations of parsimony never count for anything. As one biologist said to me:
"The fact that Williams doesn't need group selection has nothing to do with whether group selection exists." If the thought behind this remark were true, then Ockham's razor would be a purely aesthetic consideration, never offering us a reason for thinking that a given hypothesis is true.
I do not take this wholly negative view of Williams' parsimony argument, although there can be no doubt that parsimony alone does not place individual selection on a thoroughly satisfying theoretical basis.
One of the limitations of parsimony arguments in general is that they do not offer us an explanation of why the parsimonious hypothesis is true. Maybe we ought to believe that individual selection better accounts for the phenomena that Wynne-Edwards discussed. But this does not explain why group selection has played so minor a role in the history of evolution. Sewall Wright (1978) Wynne-Edwards' work and Williams' attack were followed by a series of theoretical papers (reviewed in Wade 1978) in which mathematical models were proposed and examined. The main result of these analyses has appeared to confirm Williams' orientation, in that the parameter values needed for group selection to have significant impact were generally found to be quite restrictive. This conclusion, however, has not gone unchallenged, in that it is arguable that the models contain several unrealistic assumptions that a priori bias the case against group selection (Wade 1978 As I have indicated, our interest here is not in the issue of how much of a difference group selection has made, but rather in the question of what group selection is. The various arguments and approaches that have fueled the biological controversy suggest that some rather different conceptions of group selection have been at work. Before we can identify these points of divergence, however, we ought to be clear on the common conceptual structure which is not in dispute.
For natural selection to act on a set of objects, there must be variation --the objects must be different. Moreover, the differences between the objects must include differences in their probabilities of reproductive success --there must be variation in fitness. And lastly, it usually is assumed that the fitness of parents must be correlated with the fitness of offspring --there must be heritable variation in fitness (adapted from Lewontin 1970) . This last requirement seems to me to be inessential for the existence of natural selection, although it is essential if cumulative genetic evolution by means of natural selection is to take place.
A word of clarification is in order concerning how the concept of fitness will be understood here. In any model of evolutionary processes which accords a role to random drift, fitness cannot be defined as actual reproductive success (e.g., number of viable offspring).
Since any realistic model must give drift its due, fitness is not identical with actual reproductive success. The so-called tautology of the survival of the fittest is no tautology at all; the fitter do not always turn out to be more successful. The natural reaction to this fact is to think of fitness as an expectation, in the mathematical sense, of reproductive success (see, e.g., Crow and Kimura 1970, p. 178, Mills and Beatty 1979 , and Soberl981a for discussion). The fitness of an object is its propensity, or disposition, to be reproductively successful. Fitness differences, thus construed, may be the causes of reproductive differences.
The conditions set out above for natural selection to act on a set of objects --namely that the objects should vary in fitness --require supplementation to avoid the following problem. Consider a set of organisms which are causally isolated from each other; they may be at opposite ends of the universe and experience entirely different kinds of environmental stress. Suppose they are different in their fitness values. Still, it would be odd to conclude that there is a selection process in which they are all involved. One solution to this problem is to require that the objects be in competition with each other. But, as Lewontin (1978) A more general conception of what subsumes a set of objects under a single selection process is that there must be some common causal influence acting on the objects which affects their reproductive chances.
This common influence I will call a force. Much latitude exists for determining whether two objects are subject to the same force. It may be appropriate to think of the organisms in geographically isolated local populations of the same species as all involved in a single selection process. If each experiences predation as its major environmental problem, this may suffice to say that they are exposed to the same force. If, however, some experience predation, others experience temperature fluctuation, and still others experience the disappearance of prey as the major environmental stress, it will be wrong to lump these organisms together and talk about a single selection process subsuming them all. The sameness of the forces impinging on different organisms will be determined not just by the physical characteristics of the environment, but also by the biology of the organisms involved. If a field is sprayed with one insecticide, and a second field is sprayed with a second insecticide, it may be perfectly correct to construe the two affected insect populations as part of the same selection process.
This will be true if the physical differences in the insecticides make no difference in the way those chemicals impinge on the organisms.
The idea of "sameness of force" needs to be read biologically.4
So far, I have talked about a set of objects satisfying certain conditions. What are these objects? How should the abstract structure of these conditions be interpreted? The classical, Darwinian, interpretation is that the objects are organisms that exist within the same population. Organismic, or individual, selection is generally understood as this sort of within group selection. Group selection, on the other hand, involves interpreting the structure so that the objects in- Can one define group selection in the way just suggested, as existing whenever there is heritable variation in the fitnesses of groups?
I would say not, although some biologists have used this sort of permissive characterization. The defect of the definition is that differences in reproductive capacity that obtain between groups may merely be artefacts of the differences in fitness that obtain between organisms. Williams (1966) again and again deploys this idea in criticizing group selection hypotheses. The fact that natural selection has the effect that some groups are more reproductively successful than others is not enough to show that one has group selection. Selection at lower levels of organization can have this sort of "macroscopic" upshot.
Williams' artefact argument, as I will call it, asserts that the mere existence of differences in group productivity, or in group fitness, is not enough to demonstrate that there is group selection. The crucial question is where those differences came from: are they an artefact of selection processes occurring at other levels, or are they Let's illustrate how the artefact argument works with a simple example. Imagine a system of populations, each of which is internally homogeneous with respect to height. All the individuals in population #1 are 1 foot tall, all those in population #2 are 2 feet tall, and so on, for six such populations. Now imagine that natural selection favors individuals which are taller over ones which are shorter. As a result, population #6 will be more reproductively successful than population #5, and so on. Is this a case of group selection? I doubt that many biologists would want to say that it is, and I am certain that Williams' artefact argument entails that it is not. What one has here is a case in which the differential reproductive success of groups is an artefact of differences in individual fitness. Group selection isn't to be equated with there being heritable variation in the fitnesses of groups.6
This content downloaded from 128. But that there would be a difference in no way implies that the two pair-wise competitions involve group selection. Group selection must involve more than the idea that the fitness values of organisms is influenced by the kind of groups they are in.7
A parallel line of argument can be traced in the holism/individualism dispute. Holists sometimes argue for their position by citing cases in which the properties of individuals are influenced by the groups to which they belong. We will see later on that certain situations of this kind can be crucial for confirming holism; however, the mere fact that the properties of individuals are context sensitive does not win the day against individualism. For the individualist will simply point out that the group properties which shape the character of individuals are themselves the product of individuals and their interactions.
Again, if one is unwilling to hypostatize groups, the individualist's assertion cannot be faulted. For the point being made is simply that the context sensitivity of individual properties --the way in which they depend on group context --is perfectly consistent with individuals being the material basis for all higher-level phenomena. Lewontin and Dunn (1960) of the segregator distorter tallele in the house mouse Mus musculus.
Let me give an elementary description of how the process of segregation distortion, or meiotic drive, works (see Crow 1979 for details).
Diploid organisms are ones whose chromosomes come in pairs. In the formation of sex cells, these pairs of chromosomes separate, so that sperms and eggs contain one chromosome each from each pair --they are haploid. The normal pattern for this reduction is that 50% of the sex cells contain one chromosome and 50% the other, from each homologous pair. But when a segregator distorter allele is present on a chromosome, it "subverts" this equality of representation and secures for it- was wrong; the prediction erred by being too high. This suggested to them that some third force was acting against the t-allele. The third force was group selection. The population structure of the house mouse is one of small local demes. Whenever all the males in one of these small groups are homozygous for the t-allele, the entire deme goes extinct. Females living in a group all of whose males are homozygous will have no offspring. What is more, their fitnesses (or rather the component of fitness determined by this selection process) will be 0, owing to the fact that they belong to a group of a certain kind. Females within such a group may differ in phenotype and genotype as much as you like, but such differences make no difference; their reproductive chances have been destroyed by their belonging to the kind of group they're in. Since the frequency of t-alleles among females in such groups will, on average, be higher than the frequency of t-alleles among females in groups lacking this fatal flaw, the effect of group selection will be to reduce the frequency of the t-allele. Notice that in this case, organismic and group selection are in the same direction;
both work against the t-allele. So one cannot require that group selection and individual selection always be opposing forces. Before moving on to another example of group selection and to some further biological considerations, I want to point out a philosophically interesting feature of the definition proposed. The claim that a set of groups is subject to group selection will differ from the claim that a set of objects is subject to familiar physical forces like gravity or electromagnetism. Group selection may take endlessly many different physical forms; to say that some populations are undergoing a group selection process is not yet to say what physical properties are causally efficacious, but rather is just to say that some physical property or other is responsible for fitness values in a certain way. In contrast, claiming that a particular physical force is acting on a set of objects is a much more specific claim about the physical details; for example, to say that a physical object is in an electromagnetic field is to say that its charge and its distances from other objects play a specific kind of causal role. It is in this sense that claims about evolutionary forces can be more "abstract" than claims about physical In order to give the reader some further grasp of the phenomenon that a definition of group selection is supposed to circumscribe, I
want to describe another biological example which is often cited (e.g., colonies, and roughly speaking, the lower the average virulence of a population, the better the chances are that a mosquito will transport a colonizing propagule from that population to another host. Assuming that these two selection forces are the main evolutionary forces at work, the fact that the virus declined in virulence shows that in this case the group selection force was stronger than the force of individual selection.
Less virulent strains of myxoma are "altruists". By being less virulent, they reduce their expectation of reproductive success within the population they are in, but thereby increase the group's chances of survival and reproduction by lowering the average virulence of the population. This example should correct the popular misconception that altruism must always be driven to extinction by a selection process. shows is that a crucial factor in determining the evolution of a system of this kind, in which group and individual selection oppose each other, is time. If mosquitoes bit rabbits much more rarely, or if myxoma expropriated host cells at a much faster rate, the decline in virulence of myxoma might never have occurred.
There is a theorem which represents this general idea, however.
Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection (1930) states that the rate of evolution under natural selection is identical to the additive genetic variance in fitness. Since the fundamental theorem has to do with the rate of evolution, evolution will proceed faster, the shorter the generation time of the objects involved. But since groups almost always take longer to found new colonies than the individuals within the groups take to reproduce themselves, one again has the consequence that group selection will produce smaller changes than individual selection (Crow and Kimura 1970, Lewontin 1970 ). In the myxoma example, group selection was able to exert a powerful influence precisely because of the contingent facts concerning group and individual generation times.
Although I don't want to contest the correctness of applying
Fisher's theorem in this case, it is important to identify a presupposition of using it in the general argument that group selection works more slowly than individual selection. It was pointed out earlier that the idea of group reproduction standardly used in discussing group selection is that of groups founding numerically distinct colonies. But there is no need to restrict our attention to this process, to the exclusion of considering the dynamics of population growth. Indeed, the definition of group selection we have arrived at is perfectly consistent with a system of groups undergoing a group selection process in which fitter groups increase in relative numbers. The total number of groups need not change at all. But if this kind of group selection process is considered, the argument based on Fisher's theorem cannot be made. Although individuals usually reproduce faster than their containing groups found colonies, it isn't quite so ubiquitous If a property of a group drives predators away, the individuals in the group need not benefit equally. Some might have been better than others in evading predators to begin with, and so the removal of danger may represent an unequal benefit. Still, this may be a genuine case of group selection. If some groups have properties which attract predators while others have properties which repel them, a group selection process may ensue. Though the numerical increments in fitness that members of the same group obtain from the shared group property may be unequal, the fundamental causal structure of a group selection process is still intact. The group's relation to the predator, in this case, is such that the predator reacts to the group as a unit.
Although the numbers assigned to individuals may not transparently represent this, the biological relationship of the group to its predator subsumes each individual indifferently. Though fitness values within the group may differ, each individual encounters a predator to the degree that it does because of the property of the group it is in.
Whether the biologist characterizes this aspect of the ecology in terms of a separate component of fitness or views it as a partial determinant of some more encompassing component is not what matters.
A number of consequences follow from our discussion concerning the concepts of fitness and selection. As soon as fitness is decoupled from actual reproductive success, it follows inevitably that one cannot read off fitness values from patterns of reproduction. The fact that some groups reproduce more than others does not mean that the more productive groups are fitter. Nor does the fact that some species speciate and persist more than others imply that species selection is occurring, or that some species are fitter than others (see Stanley 1975 and Gould 1980 for discussions of species selection). Fitness and selection are both causal concepts; they describe the causes of change and not the fact that there has been differential productivity.
Perhaps a more surprising consequence of our discussion is that fitness and selection are decoupled from each other. In spite of the fact that fitness values and selection coefficients are interdefinable in mathematical models (so that, typically, s = 1 -w), there is an important difference between these concepts. As we saw in our simple example of a series of populations which were each internally homogeneous for height, the fact that groups differ in fitness does not imply that there is group selection. The groups, in this example, differed in fitness in that they had different propensities to be reproductively successful. But the cause of these fitness differences was individual, not group, selection.
Selection is a richer concept than fitness. In fact, the relation of selection to fitness is somewhat like the relation of fitness to This difference between fitness and selection is not surprising, when one considers that fitness is a disposition while natural selection is a force. Although the forces at work determine certain dispositions in the objects present, the dispositions of those objects do The fundamental flaw in this kind of argument is that it confuses the task of formulating a predictively successful mathematical apparatus with the task of accurately describing the causal structure of selection processes. It is to be granted that all of the information about higher-level selection can be represented in the so-called selection coefficients of organisms or genes (Levins 1970 (Levins , 1975 Wade 1979) , but that simply does not imply that, in nature, it is individual or genic selection which is always occurring. Genes may be modelled as maximizing their fitnesses, but that leaves open the question of what causal processes propel changes in gene frequencies (Wilson 1980 Dawkins 1976) . This is not to say that facts about heritability are irrelevant to the question of how selection at different levels may produce cumulative evolution (see Lewontin 1970 for this kind of argument). But any such argument must do more than merely point out that genes are the devices by which characteristics are inherited.
Between Scylla and Charybdis
The stock market crash, which was a social fact, was caused by market conditions, which constitute other social facts. These market conditions, in turn, were caused by individual interactions. By transitivity of causality, the individual interactions caused the stock market crash. If social facts cause something, so do individual facts. Once we decide to avoid atomism on the one hand and hypostatis on the other, the sensible middle course appears to provide no asymmetry between the social and the individual; both are causally efficacious.
Yet, it is emphatically not the case that if group selection causes something, so does individual selection. Group selection and individual selection are objectively distinct forces. Individual selection does not require an atomistic view of the organism; it does not require one to ignore the fact that organismic fitness is context sensitive. Individual selection is a process that a sensible individualist can embrace. Similarly, group selection does not require a reification of the group; it does not force one to suppose that groups are something above and beyond the interactions of their member individuals and the environment. Group selection is a process that a sensible holist can embrace. And, best of all, it is a substantive empirical question what the role and importance of these two forms of selection has been in the history of evolution. Characterizing these components is a highly nontrivial task, one which we have barely begun to discharge. Although it is transparent that the admissions test is a form of selection, the character of this selection process is in many ways extremely opaque.
Another application to social processes that can be made of our distinction between group and individual selection involves the idea of the selection of selection processes. Besides wanting to answer the question of how the admissions test works, one would also like to know where it came from --how it came to be used as the admissions test.
Even if it were true that the admissions test embodied a form of individual selection, the possibility remains open that it evolved by a process of group selection. Perhaps part of the cause of its being used is that it has certain group level results; this may be true even if the test does not make its discriminations on the basis of group membership.
Marxist critiques of "bourgeois" social science often have two components (Keat and Urry 1977) . First, bourgeois social science is allegedly too individualistic in its orientation, seeing the individual rather than the group as the correct unit of analysis. Secondly, it is claimed to be superficial in the kinds of questions it asks about society, typically focusing on issues concerning the regularities that social institutions obey, rather than on more structural questions having to do with why those institutions are as they are. These two lines of criticism are not unrelated, of course, since, for Marxists, an explanation of why particular social institutions have the form they do must crucially involve considerations of class conflict. From this point of view, the results of bourgeois social theory need not be false, but they must be incomplete. This means that if they are, mistakenly, taken to be complete, they will offer a distorted view of social life.
One might interpret this point of view as holding that social institutions, at least in bourgeois society, embody a form of individual selection, but that they evolved by a process of group selection. One of the differences between bourgeois and feudal society may consist in which properties of individuals determine how social institutions treat them. Whereas membership in particular social groups was used to decide all manner of social sortings out, these criteria are much less often the ones which are directly invoked in bourgeois society. Rather, the mechanisms have shifted toward the structure of individual selec- 2The argument presented in Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1976) against identifying psychological and physical properties may be applicable to the relationship between social properties and the properties of individual psychology. Just as a given psychological property may be "multiply realizable" in indefinitely many physical forms, so a given social property may have indefinitely many realizations at the level of individual psychology. For an application of this line of thinking to the relationship of biological properties like fitness to physical properties, see Rosenberg (1978) .
3The present discussion of holism and individualism and of causality assumes the truth of determinism, but this assumption is not essential to the points at issue. If quantum mechanical states at one time do not uniquely determine such states at a later time, then, on the assumption that macro-states are token/token identical with quantum mechanical states, it follows that macro-states at one time do not determine macro-states at a later time. Thus, from the point of view of causal determination, not only will facts about individuals fail to causally determine social facts; it will also be true that earlier social facts fail to causally determine later social facts. 
